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1 Introduction
When trading goods within and across borders, firms choose between different payment
contracts. The key decision is whether the payment should be made before the delivery
(cash in advance) or after the delivery (open account). This is an important aspect of
any trade transaction as it determines both which trading partner has to pre-finance the
transaction and who bears its risk. As shown theoretically in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013),
payment contracts in international trade should therefore be chosen by firms to optimally
trade-off differences in financing costs and enforcement between countries.
The payment contract choice affects several key aspects of international trade. First, as
payment contracts allocate financing and risk across countries they determine how source
and destination country legal and financial conditions affect variable trade costs. This also
determines on which country’s financial sector trade predominantly relies and thus influences
the direction in which financial shocks may be transmitted internationally. Finally, the
payment choice model predicts that conditions in the source and destination country are
equally important for trade to be successful. This suggests that policy makers interested in
promoting trade not only need to improve institutions at home but also need to help their
trading partners in improving their legal and financial environment. The payment choice is
thus relevant both for academic economists to better understand trade frictions as well as
for policy makers interested in supporting international commerce.
This paper provides evidence on firms’ payment contract choices from a large number of
countries, showing that country characteristics are indeed central determinants. As predicted
by the theory, international transactions are more likely paid after delivery when financing
costs in the source country are high and when contract enforcement is low. We extend the
original theory and use the firm-level data to test one additional prediction on the role of
industry characteristics. More specifically, we show that in more complex industries contract
enforcement is key to the choice of the payment contract, whereas for less complex industries
financing costs are more relevant.
The basic trade finance model is quite intuitive. Due to the time gap between produc-
tion and sales, any transaction in international trade requires working capital financing and
implies a commitment problem. If pre-delivery payment (cash in advance) is chosen, the im-
porter finances the transaction and a commitment problem arises on the side of the exporter.
Post-delivery payment (open account) implies the reverse. The exporter has to pre-finance
the required working capital and the importer’s commitment problem needs to be resolved.
This setup delivers clear predictions on how country-level variables affect the contract
choice. Post-delivery payment (open account) should be used more if finance in the source
country is cheap and if enforcement in the source country is weak. The former directly affects
profits under open account while the latter reduces the profitability of the alternative cash
in advance and thereby makes open account more attractive.
To test these predictions, this paper uses data from the World Bank Enterprise survey,
complemented by measures for contract enforcement and financing costs. The survey is
conducted across a wide range of developing countries, where each firm is surveyed once.
From the survey we obtain the share of pre- and post-sale payments and export intensities
as well as other firm-level control variables. The unique advantage of the dataset in relation
to the existing literature is that we are able to exploit the variation in enforcement and
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financing costs across the exporter’s countries, relating it to a firm’s export intensity and
payment contract choice.1
Our identification strategy rests on three results developed in the theory section. First,
we show that there is a difference between payment contract choice for domestic and in-
ternational transactions. In the former, both parties find themselves in the same legal and
financial environment while in the latter this is not the case. Country characteristics should
hence be more important for the payment contract choice for international than for domestic
transactions. Second, we show that it is sufficient to rely on variation across source coun-
tries to identify the trade-off between different payment contracts. Third, we show that an
interaction effect between the firms’ export intensities and country-level financing costs and
enforcement can be estimated to obtain the main coefficients of interest. Building on these
results, we test the payment contract choice between post-delivery payment and its alterna-
tive pre-delivery payment by using interaction terms between firms’ export intensities, and
country-level enforcement and financing costs as the independent variables.
In the theoretical model, one seller is matched with one buyer. Both firms are risk neutral
and play a one shot game. The seller can make a take it or leave it offer to the buyer,
specifying the price and the quantity of the goods sold and the timing of the payment. If
payment is demanded before delivery (cash in advance), the importer has to borrow money
in her local financial market. As she pays in advance, there is an incentive for the seller
not to deliver the goods. This is prevented by courts with an exogenously given probability
that depends on legal institutions in the source country. If the seller chooses payment after
delivery (open account), she has to borrow on her financial market. Now, the buyer, who
receives the goods before payment, has an incentive to deviate from the contract. With
an exogenous probability that depends on destination country, however, courts enforce the
contract.
The optimal payment contract choice thus depends on the relative financing costs and
the relative probabilities of contract enforcement of the buyer and the seller, respectively. If
the buyer and seller are in the same country, the choice only depends on firm-specific factors.
If the two trading partners are located in different countries, the choice is also affected by
country-level variables. For international sales, country-level characteristics thus influence
the payment contract choice at the firm level while they do not affect domestic choices.
In the baseline specification of the empirical section we exploit the difference between
domestic and foreign sales using the information on the firm’s export intensity and post-
sale payments from the survey. In particular, we interact the firm’s export intensity with
the measures of enforcement and financing costs to test the prediction that firms with a
higher export intensity react more to country-level variations in financing costs and contract
enforcement than firms with a larger share of domestic sales.2 The empirical results are
exactly as predicted by the theory. That is, for international sales, better enforcement in
the source country increases the use of pre-delivery payment and reduces the use of post-
delivery payment. Higher financing costs in the source country imply that more contracts
are on pre-delivery payment and less contracts are on post-delivery payment terms.
1In contrast, Antra`s and Foley (2011) use the variation across importer’s enforcement and financing costs
and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) uses country-level trade flows without any payment contract information.
2Our main measure of contract enforcement is the inverse of days it takes to enforce a contract in court,
while financial costs are captured by the net interest rate margin.
3
Contract enforcement depends on the verifiability of contracts in court. It can be argued
that this is more difficult for complex products which are often relationship-specific. When
products are not widely traded or produced exclusively for a specific counter-party, it may be
difficult for courts to determine whether quality standards and other product requirements
have been met by the supplier, making enforcement harder. This is analyzed in an extended
version of the model and tested in the second empirical specification where we use the
complexity measure from Nunn (2007) to classify industries. Triple interactions between
financing costs and enforcement, export intensity and the complexity of an industry are
then added to the estimation equation. In line with the extended model, we find that the
strength of contract enforcement is relatively more important for the contract choice in
complex industries, while financing costs are more relevant for the choice in less complex
industries.
We check the robustness of our results and show that they are very similar when alter-
native measures of legal and financial conditions are used. Running regressions with data
aggregated to the industry level and alternatively using a fractional response model delivers
similar findings to the OLS regressions.
To our knowledge, only two papers have tested the payment contract choice model empir-
ically.3 Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) derives implications of contract choice for bilateral trade
flows and uses them for an indirect test of the model with aggregate trade data. Antra`s
and Foley (2011) are closest to this paper as they directly test the choice between payment
contracts. They extend the model in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and test its predictions in
regard of destination country variation in enforcement with data from one large US food
seller. Their paper furthermore exploits the rich time dimension of the data to study dy-
namic aspects of payment contract choice in international trade. This paper adds to this
line of research by providing evidence on the contract choice across many independent firms
in many source countries and by testing for differences across industries.4
This study focuses on the effects of international differences in legal and financial con-
ditions on the payment contract choice for international and domestic trade. It therefore
complements the large literature on trade credit that explains the use of supplier credit
within a country.5 The analysis also relates to the wider literature on financial conditions
and trade. First, there are several papers that have studied whether conditions in the source
country can affect bilateral trade patterns and sectoral specialization.6 A second group of
3Glady and Potin (2011) focus on letters of credit and analyze how their use is affected by country-level
contract enforcement and financing costs, but do not test for choices between different payment contracts.
4For theoretical contributions to trade finance see Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), Ahn (2010), Antra`s and
Foley (2011), Engemann et al. (2011), Eck et al. (2011) and Olsen (2013). See Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) for
a review. Several policy papers also discuss trade finance. See for example Menichini (2011) and Ellingsen
and Vlachos (2009).
5For recent empirical contributions see Giannetti et al. (2011) and Klapper et al. (2012). For theoretical
aspects of trade credit see among others Biais and Gollier (1997), Petersen and Rajan (1997), Wilner (2000),
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and Cunat (2007). Mateut (2012) extends the analysis of trade credit to pre-
payments which she denotes as reverse trade credit. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), Choi and Kim
(2005) and Love et al. (2007) study the effect of country-level variables on trade credit use. Their analysis
does, however, not distinguish between domestic and international sales. Klapper et al. (2012) contains an
excellent review of the trade credit literature.
6See, in particular, Beck (2002), Beck (2003) and Manova (2013).
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papers have tested whether financial constraints can be a detriment to international trade,
in particular at the extensive margin.7 Third, several papers tested for the effects of financial
shocks on trade in times of crisis.8
By deriving and testing new results on the interaction between the product complexity
and enforcement, the paper also adds to the work in this area by Nunn (2007) and Levchenko
(2007). Finally, Eck et al. (2011) use similar data on the shares of pre- and post-delivery
payments in total sales to test for effects of trade credit on the extensive and intensive
margins of trade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model
and derives the predictions for the empirical analysis. In section 3, we present the empirical
results of the paper and report our robustness exercises. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
This section starts with a simplified version of Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), focusing on the
choice between cash in advance and open account.9 It then extends the model to allow
for differences in contract choice between domestic and international sales and for a role of
industry complexity.
Setup There is one seller S who is matched with one buyer B. Firms are risk neutral.
The seller and the buyer play a one-shot game. The seller makes a take it or leave it offer to
the buyer. The buyer can accept or reject the offer. Then, the seller can produce and send
goods to the buyer. The goods arrive at the buyer in the next period and sales revenues are
realized. Firms can be of a good and bad type. η and η∗ denote the shares of good firms
in the source and destination country, respectively. A good firm always fulfills a contract
whereas a bad firm breaks it whenever this is profitable. Production costs are given by K
and revenues are given by R. There is a time gap between the dispatch of the goods by the
seller and their arrival at the buyer. This gives rise to a working capital need that has to
be financed by one of the two parties. Let source and destination country interest rates be
denoted by 1 + r and 1 + r∗.
In addition to the financing requirement, the time gap also leads to a commitment prob-
lem of bad firms. If the buyer pays in advance, the seller has an incentive not to deliver
the goods after receipt of the payment. When the buyer only pays after the goods arrive
(open account), she has an incentive not to transfer the money. In either case a firm can be
brought to court by its trading partner. Assume that litigation takes place in the location
where the breach of contract occurs and that enforcement is successful with exogenously
7See among others Greenaway et al. (2007), Muuˆls (2008), Berman and He´ricourt (2010), Bricongne et
al. (2012) and Manova (2013).
8See Paravisini et al. (2011), Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Ahn (2013) and Niepmann and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2013b).
9In the original model there is a third payment contract, letter of credit, that we abstract from in the
analysis as we cannot separately identify it in our data. We discuss letters of credit in more detail below.
Given the similarity with the setup developed in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), the exposition of the baseline
model is kept brief.
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given probabilities λ and λ∗, respectively.10
The seller is by definition always located in the source country and therefore faces en-
forcement probability λ and interest rate r. The buyer can be in the same country facing
the same country conditions or she can be in another country. Then she faces enforcement
probability λ∗ and interest rate r∗. For the general case we start by denoting the buyer
variables with subscript B.
Cash in Advance Cash in advance corresponds to a full pre-payment by the buyer. That
is, before delivery, the buyer pays an amount CCIA to the seller. A bad seller defaults on the
contract, but with probability λ she is forced to deliver the goods anyways.11 The optimal
contract depends only on the choice of a good seller.12 Maximizing profits delivers:13
E
[
ΠCIAS
]
=
η + (1− η)λ
1 + rB
R−K. (1)
As cash in advance requires complete pre-financing by the buyer, only her financing costs
1 + rB affect expected profits. The commitment problem is in regard of the seller. Thus,
only contract enforcement λ and the share of good firms η in the source country are relevant
for expected profits.
Open Account Open account represents full payment after delivery. First, the seller
produces the goods and delivers them to the buyer. When the goods arrive, the buyer sells
them. While a good buyer pays the amount due, a bad buyer tries to default on the contract,
but is forced to pay with probability λB.
14 Maximized expected profits are:
E
[
ΠOAS
]
=
ηB + (1− ηB)λB
1 + r
R−K. (2)
Open account represents exactly the reverse case from cash in advance. Now, pre-financing
is done completely by the seller and thus only her financing cost 1 + r affects expected
profits. The commitment problem arises on the side of the buyer and therefore solely the
enforcement probability λB and the share of good firms ηB influence expected profits.
10Parties may agree on another country as place of litigation. However, any ruling requires enforcement in
the location where the assets or collateral are located. Hence, even in the case where litigation takes place
in a third country, local legal conditions are still key for contract enforcement.
11A pooling or separating case can arise. In the pooling case, a bad firm imitates the behaviour of good
firms. Alternatively, bad firms can choose to deviate. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that parameters
are such that only the pooling case arises, which requires that RK ≥ 1+r
∗
η . In this, we follow the assumption
in Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013). See the online appendix for details.
12In the following all expressions on expected profits are in regard of good sellers under pooling. Subscript
g for good seller and superscript p for the pooling case are dropped for expositional purposes.
13See the online appendix for details.
14The exporter now chooses between a pooling case where both types of buyers accept the offered contract
and a separating case where the demanded payment is so high that only bad buyers agree to it. Again, we
assume that parameters are such that the pooling case arises which is the case if RK >
η∗(1+r)
η∗−(1−η∗)(1−λ∗) . See
the online appendix for details.
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Letters of Credit As we cannot observe it in our data, we abstract from a third type of
payment contract, letter of credit (LC).15 An LC can be provided by a bank in the country
of the importer and guarantees payment to the exporter against the presentation of a set
of documents. The importer only receives these documents from the bank after paying the
amount due. An LC therefore fulfills two roles. First, similar to trade credit insurance,
it shifts the risk of non-payment from the exporter to the issuing bank in the destination
country. Second, it works as a commitment device for the importer to pay and thereby
reduces the real risk of the transaction. Letters of credit are currently employed for about
8.8 % of all U.S. exports (see Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013a)). For more details
on the role of letters of credit and empirical evidence on its use see Niepmann and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2013a), Ahn (2010) and Olsen (2013).16
Optimal Contract Choice Assume that there is a firm-specific additive shock to the
profitability of open account denoted by Zi that is proportional to R, that is Zi = ziR.
17
In the following, the optimal payment contract choice in international trade and domestic
trade are studied separately. The differences between the two are key to the identification
strategy.
Suppose that the buyer and the seller are in two different countries, so that rB = r
∗ and
λB = λ
∗. Then, the seller chooses open account over cash in advance iff:
E
[
ΠOAS
]
> E
[
ΠCIAS
]⇔ λ˜∗
1 + r
− λ˜
1 + r∗
+ zi > 0 (3)
For domestic trade both firms face the same country level interest rate and enforcement
probability, that is rB = r and λB = λ. The condition thus simplifies to:
E
[
ΠOAS
]
> E
[
ΠCIAS
]⇔ zi > 0. (4)
These results are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. The optimal choice of payment contract is uniquely determined by equation
(3) for international transactions and by equation (4) for domestic transactions.
Proof. Omitted.
The payment contract choice in international trade depends on the financial conditions
and the legal environment both in the origin and the destination. For domestic trade,
however, the choice only depends on the firm-level shock. The country-level financing costs
15In the data, letters of credit are most likely to be reported as on-delivery sales. To address the concern
that unobserved LCs may affect our results, we also run regressions where we only use information about
sales that are not on-delivery. See the empirical section for details.
16Additionally, readers may be interested in Ahn (2013) and Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013b),
who study the role of letter of credit supply shocks and Demir et al. (2013) who look at the role of Basel II
for the supply of letters of credit.
17While not the focus of our analysis, these shocks are necessary to generate heterogeneity across firms
that is observed in the data.
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and payment probabilities do not affect the contract choice for domestic transactions because
with domestic sales they do not differ between the buyer and the seller.18
Let z¯I denote the value at which a firm is indifferent between using open account and
cash in advance for an international transaction. This cutoff can be derived easily from
equation (3) as:
z¯I =
λ˜
1 + r∗
− λ˜
∗
1 + r
(5)
All sellers for which zi > z¯
I , choose open account terms for their international sales. The
share of open account in international transactions thus increases weakly if and only if z¯I
decreases.
Let SOA,I denote the share of open account in international transactions. The follow-
ing Proposition derives the effects of source and destination country characteristics on the
payment contract choice for international sales:
Proposition 2. Weakly more export contracts are on open account terms if
i) contract enforcement in the source country is worse: ∂S
OA,I
∂λ
≤ 0
ii) financing costs in the source country are lower: ∂S
OA,I
∂(1+r)
≤ 0
Proof. Note that ∂S
OA,I
∂z¯I
≤ 0. Then, i) and ii) follow directly from taking the derivative of z¯I
with respect to the two variables of interest.
More firm pairs use an open-account contract for international sales if financing costs at
the source are low. Furthermore, open account is used more if enforcement in the source
country is weak as this reduces the profitability of the alternative cash in advance.
Interaction Terms In the data, we observe the share of open account in total sales. There
is, however, no information on the split of this variable between domestic and international
sales. In the following, we show that it is possible to test the predictions on contract choice for
international sales by employing interaction terms between export intensity and the country-
level variables. This works because country-level characteristics affect the payment contract
choice for international sales but not for domestic sales as derived in Proposition 1. Note
that the share of open account can be expressed as:
SOA = SOA,IXS + SOA,D(1−XS), (6)
where SOA, SOA,I and SOA,D are the shares of open account in total, international and
domestic sales, respectively. XS is the share of exports in total sales.
The following Proposition summarizes the effect on changes in country level characteris-
tics on firms with different export intensities:
18Firms within a country of course often face different financing costs and can have heterogeneous abilities
to enforce contracts. In our setup any such differences at the firm level would be mapped into the error term
zi.
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Proposition 3. An exporter uses weakly more open account than another exporter who
generates a smaller share of her revenues abroad if
i) contract enforcement in the source country is worse: ∂
2SOA
∂XS∂λ
≤ 0
ii) financing costs in the source country are lower: ∂
2SOA
∂XS∂(1+r)
≤ 0
Proof. ∂S
OA
∂XS
= SOA,I −SOA,D. Noting that SOA,D is independent of λ and r, the rest follows
directly from Proposition 2.
Source-country characteristics affect the payment contract for international sales but not
for domestic sales. Any change in the share of open account in total sales that is related to
changes in country-level variables can therefore be attributed to adjustment of international
sales contracts. The cross-derivatives of the share of open account in total sales with respect
to the export intensity and the two country variables therefore give us the marginal effects
of interest. Hence, interaction terms between export intensities and financing costs and
enforcement, respectively, can be employed to estimate the relationships.
Complexity of products Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) have shown that prod-
uct complexity affects the patterns of trade. Does product complexity also affect the pay-
ment contract choice? Sales of complex products often involve customization and other
relationship-specific investments on the side of the seller. These expenditures as well as the
quality of the delivered product can be difficult to verify in court. Contract enforcement
should therefore be harder for complex products. The involved parties might thus be par-
ticularly keen to choose the payment contract that shifts the commitment problem to the
country with better legal institutions when products are more complex.
In the following this idea is introduced and its effects on the contract choice are analyzed.
Assume that there is a complementarity between product complexity and contract enforce-
ment. That is, better courts improve contract enforcement more for complex products than
for non-complex products. Let γ ∈ [0, 1] denote the complexity of a product and assume that
the probability of enforcement now equals λγ. For γ = 0, the product is the least complex
and the country level enforcement factor equals one. The higher γ, the more complex is the
product and the harder is enforcement in court. For international trade, this implies that:
E
[
ΠOAS
]
> E
[
ΠCIAS
]⇔ η∗ + (1− η∗) (λ∗)γ
1 + r
− η + (1− η)λ
γ
1 + r∗
+ zi > 0 (7)
From this, the following proposition can be derived:
Proposition 4. Suppose λ > 1/e. Then, the effect of λ on the payment contract choice, as
stated in Proposition 3 is the larger, the higher the product complexity γ. The effect of 1 + r
on the payment contract choice is the smaller, the higher the product complexity γ. That is:
i) ∂
3SOA
∂XS∂λ∂γ
≤ 0; ii) ∂3SOA
∂XS∂(1+r)∂γ
≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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The Proposition predicts that exporters in complex industries should put relatively more
weight on cross-country differences in contract enforcement and relatively less weight on
differences in financing costs.19 Note that the prediction that financing costs matter less for
the payment choice in more complex industries represents an indirect effect. While for both
industries financing costs affect profits the same way, they are relatively less important for
decisions in complex industries as in those industries going for the country with the strongest
contract enforcement is the dominating motive.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Data
The main data source for the analysis of the payment contract choice is the World Bank
Enterprise Survey. It is a comprehensive firm-level survey, conducted in a wide range of
developing countries. The analysis is based on a cross-section of firms from data collected
between 2006-2009. Each firm was interviewed once.
In the survey, a firm was asked which percentage of its annual sales in the last fiscal
year was paid before-, after- or on-delivery. We classify payment before-delivery as cash in
advance. Payments on- and after-delivery are assigned to open account. Both in the case
of on- and after-delivery payments, the exporter bears the risk of non-payment and has to
finance the transaction.20 From the survey we also use the export intensity, defined as the
share of exports in total sales as well as a set of firm-level controls.21
The survey data contains rich information about the payment structure of sales for a
large number of firms from many countries. This allows for the first time to test for the
role of source country characteristics on the payment contract choice and to study the role
of industry characteristics. There are, however, several data limitations that are important
to note. One drawback of the data is that we cannot observe separately if firms employ
letters of credit. LCs are most likely reported as on-delivery payments and thus represent an
additional reason why distinguishing between post-delivery and on-delivery payments might
be useful. In a robustness exercise, we therefore ignore the information about on-delivery
payments and redefine the share of open account as the share of post-delivery payments
in all transactions that are either on pre-delivery or post-delivery terms. Results remain
unchanged when employing this alternative measure of open account. Another shortcoming
of the data set is that the timing of payments is only reported at the firm level. Ideally, one
would like to observe this information separately for exports and domestic sales. As discussed
earlier and spelled out in more detail below, we can overcome this limitation of the data by
employing interaction terms between export intensities and the variables of interest. Finally,
the data are only a cross-section, so we cannot include firm fixed effects in the regression.
The survey allows, however, to control for a broad set of firm-level variables.
19The condition λ > 1/e is quite weak as 1/e ≈ .37.
20There is a notable difference between the two as post-delivery payment requires a longer financing period
and can imply a larger risk for the buyer than on-delivery payment.
21The additional firm-level controls are sales per worker, age, manager’s experience, state-owned and
import status.
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The firm-level data is augmented by two additional sources to proxy for enforcement and
financing costs in the different countries. First, we use the number of days it takes to enforce
a commercial dispute in a country, which is extracted from the World Bank Doing Business
database. We interpret a delay in payment contract as weaker enforcement. For ease of
interpretation, the measure is inverted.
Second, we capture the financial conditions at the country level by using financial vari-
ables from Beck et al. (2009). In the baseline regression financing costs are proxied by the
net interest rate margin. It is an ex-post efficiency measure for the overall banking sector
and is calculated as the ratio of the net interest revenues over total assets of all banks in a
country. In addition we use the private credit over GDP and overhead costs as alternative
proxies for financing conditions. Private credit over GDP is a proxy for general financial
development. The higher this measure, the lower should be the financing costs for firms.
Our third variable is given by the sum of all overhead costs of a banking sector over total
bank assets. This is another measure for the efficiency of a banking system. Lower overhead
costs should imply lower costs of financial services. All three proxies for financing costs are
commonly used in the literature on financial conditions and trade.
We also make some adjustments to the data set to reduce measurement error and to
bring it in line with the model. First, only data on manufacturing firms is used for the
analysis as for this sector standard trade theory seems most appropriate. Data for all other
sectors are dropped from the sample. Furthermore, as the theory mainly applies to trade
at arm’s length, firms that are affiliates of multinational companies or are owned fully or
partially by foreigners are excluded.22 In the survey, interviewers can indicate at the end
of the interview whether they believe that answers of firms where truthful and reliable. To
limit measurement error, observations for which interviewers do not believe this to be the
case are dropped.23 Finally, additional observations are lost when merging in the additional
data sets containing our measures of contract enforcement and financing costs.
Summary statistics of the final data set are reported in table 1. While the original
survey data set contains 9,616 observations of exporters in the manufacturing sector from
92 developing countries, the data set used for the baseline regression has 3,762 observations
of exporters from 53 countries.
Data Discussion Both open account shares and export intensities of firms take values
anywhere in the range between zero and one. No strong clustering can be observed. While
there is a mass point of open account at one, there is a large variation in the use of open
account.24
The data set is well balanced in regard of country observations as shown in table 2. While
there is some heterogeneity, no single country’s observations dominate the data set. Also,
from table 1 we see that with a mean below 50% and a high standard deviation, the export
intensity of firms seems well balanced. According to the sample note, the survey is biased
22One way to resolve the commitment problem discussed in the theory is to become a multinational
firm. When we run regressions on affiliates only, the effects of enforcement indeed lose their significance as
expected.
23This is the case if the interviewer chooses answer 3 for questions a16 or a17 in the survey.
24In the sample, 28% of firms have a post-delivery payment share of one. If we calculate the share of firms
with a combined on-delivery and post-delivery share of one, this number rises to 58%.
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towards larger firms. The summary statistics suggest that there is a sizeable variation in
both the log sales per worker and the log employment. In our estimation, we also control
for reputation effects on the payment contract choice by including the age of the firm and
the manager’s experience. The average firm is about 15 years old, whereas the average
manager has an experience of 20 years. Both variables have a high variance. In the dataset
only a small fraction of firms is state owned (0.8%). The mean on the importer dummy
shows that a large fraction of the firms are importers (76%). All proxies for enforcement and
financing conditions have high standard deviations, indicating a substantial cross-country
heterogeneity in contract enforcement and financing conditions in our sample.
3.2 Methodology and Specification
Methodology The baseline regressions employ OLS estimation at the firm level. We
report robust standard errors in all regressions. In the robustness section we follow two
alternative approaches. First, to mitigate the problem of endogeneity at the firm level, we
estimate the relationships for industry averages. Second, because the share of open account
is between 0 and 1, we use a fractional response model to directly take this restriction into
account. All estimation techniques deliver similar results.
Identification Identification is based on the theoretical results summarized in Proposition
3. Proposition 3 states that for an exporter that generates more of her revenues abroad
than another exporter, country level financial conditions and contract enforcement have a
larger effect on the payment contract choice. We exploit this result for our identification by
including interaction terms between the export intensity and our measures of enforcement
and financing costs, respectively. To ensure identification and to meet the assumptions of
the theoretical model we focus on firms with a positive export intensity, dropping all other
firms from our dataset.
Proposition 1 justifies the use of the export intensities for identification. Domestic sales,
in contrast to exports, should not be not affected by changes in enforcement and financing
costs because the seller and the buyer face the same country level conditions. Furthermore,
we show in Proposition 2 that it is sufficient for identification to rely on source country
variation.
Main Specification The dependent variable is the share of open account payments in
total sales. Note that only one equation needs to be estimated as all remaining transactions
are classified as cash in advance. The equation takes the following form:
OAit = ψ0 + ψ1XSit + ψ2XSit × ENFct + ψ3XSit × INTct + ΨXit + νj + νc + νt + it. (8)
An observation is the share of open account OAit in the total sales of firm i in year t.
The regressions include the firm-level controls as well as industry (j), country (c) and year
fixed effects.25 XS is the export intensity. ENF represents contract enforcement and INT
25The firm-level controls are listed in table 1.
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denotes the net interest rate margin.26
The main prediction of the model is on the coefficients of the two interaction terms
between export intensity and enforcement, ψ2, and export intensity and financing costs,
ψ3, respectively. In international transactions, the share of open account should decrease
in source country enforcement, as this makes cash in advance more attractive. It should
also decrease in source country financing costs, because this reduces profits from open ac-
count. For domestic transactions, open account use is independent of these variables. Taken
together, this implies that the coefficients on both interactions ψ2 and ψ3 should be negative.
Industry Complexity Proposition 4 predicts that the extent to which contract enforce-
ment affects the payment contract choice should be related to the complexity of the industry
the exporter is operating in. More precisely, the contract choice of a firm in a more complex
industry should be more affected by differences in contract enforcement and less influenced
by interest rate differentials.
In the theory section we argue that a product is complex if it involves customization and
other relationship-specific investments. In industries where relationship-specific investments
are high, the judicial quality should matter more, because it is more difficult to verify whether
the quality of the produced good meets the specification. When products are more specific,
firms therefore have a stronger incentive to default when courts are weak in their country. We
measure the degree of complexity by adopting the classification developed in Nunn (2007),
which is based on intermediate inputs. Industries that use a large share of intermediate inputs
that are either not traded on an exchange or where no reference price exists tend to be more
contractually intensive and are classified as more complex.27 For example, in our data, the
manufacture of refined petroleum products (ISIC code: 2320) is classified as an industry of
low complexity whereas motor vehicles production (ISIC code: 3410) is classified as a complex
industry. It is quite intuitive that the quality of petroleum products should be easier to verify
than the quality of motor vehicles, which consist of a large number of complex parts. The
classification in Nunn (2007) is developed using the US input-output table. A drawback of
this approach is that one needs to assume that the complexity measure constructed with US
data can be applied to all countries in the data set. To test the predictions of Proposition
4, the following specification is estimated:
OAit = ψ0 + ψ1XSit + ψ2XSit × ENFct + ψ3XSit × INTct (9)
+ ψ4XSit × ENFct × COMj + ψ5XSit × INTct × COMj
+ ψ6XSit × COMj + ψ7ENFct × COMj + ψ8INTct × COMj
+ νj + νc + νt + it.
The two coefficients of interest are ψ4 and ψ5 on the triple interactions between the export
intensity, industry complexity and source country enforcement and financing costs, respec-
26Note that the data is not a panel but a cross-section of firms from 53 countries, and the vast majority of
countries (51) appear in the data only once. As we have already included country fixed effects there remains
little variation within countries across years to identify the effects of ENF and INT on their own.
27To use the industry classification in Nunn (2007), it is mapped to the industry classification of the data
set. A correspondence from SITC to ISIC developed for this purpose is available on request.
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tively. The model predicts ψ4 < 0 and ψ5 > 0. That is, the more complex the industry of a
firm, the stronger the effect of contract enforcement and the weaker the effect of financing
costs on the international payment contract choice.
3.3 Results
Baseline In table 3 column 1 we report the results for the baseline specification. All results
are highly statistically significant and all coefficients have the signs predicted by the theory.
The coefficient on the interaction between contract enforcement and the export intensity
is negative as expected. Firms use less open account for international sales if contract
enforcement in the source country is better. The estimated coefficient on the net interest
rate margin interaction is negative. The share of open account in international transactions
thus decreases in the financing costs.
To check the robustness of our results the net interest margin is replaced by alternative
financial measures. Substituting in either private credit over GDP or overhead costs over
total assets in columns 2 and 3 in table 3 respectively, delivers very similar results. Note
that the coefficient on private credit is positive because it is an inverse measure of financing
costs, that is a higher private credit over GDP ratio should capture lower financing costs.
Industry Complexity The results for the estimation of equation (9) are summarized in
columns 4 to 6 of table 3. The coefficients for the two triple interactions in column 4 have
the predicted signs. The estimated coefficient on the enforcement triple interaction is highly
significant, large and negative. It implies that the more complex an industry, the larger the
effect of contract enforcement on the payment contract choice. The net interest rate margin
triple interaction has the predicted positive sign. It is, however, only significant at a 20%
level. Note that the coefficient has roughly the same magnitude as the one estimated for
the interaction between the net interest margin and the export intensity. This suggests that
for firms in the most complex industries, financing costs do not affect the payment contract
choice. Indeed, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that both coefficients add to zero. Firms
in non-complex industries, however, use substantially less open account if financing costs are
high. As predicted by Proposition 4, the contract choice in industries that produce more
complex products is hence more affected by the legal environment whereas financing costs
are more relevant in less complex industries.
Again, we estimate the same relationship for the different proxies of financing costs and
enforcement in the remaining columns of table 3. The results are robust to the use of
alternative variables. If we use private credit as the proxy for the financing conditions, the
coefficient on the triple interaction is highly significant and has the predicted negative sign.
The coefficient for the enforcement triple interaction has the right sign but is insignificant.
When we use the overhead costs as our financial proxy we get similar results to using the net
interest margin. Both signs of the triple interaction coefficients are as predicted. They are
significant for enforcement but insignificant for overhead costs. While not always significant,
all estimated coefficients are in line with the predictions of the model.
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Quantitative Size of Effects What is the economic size of the estimated effects? As
discussed in the theory section, the estimates on the interaction terms of financing costs
and contract enforcement with the export intensity exactly identify the effects of interest,
that is ∂S
OA,I
∂(1+r)
and ∂S
OA,I
∂λ
. To evaluate the size of these effects, consider a country at the 25
percentile in enforcement and financing costs. Suppose this country improved both its legal
and financial conditions such that it moves to the 75 percentile in both measures.28 By how
much would the share of open account in international sales increase? Table 4 shows the
results of this experiment. According to the estimates, the increase in enforcement would
decrease the share of open account by 6.3 percentage points, while the increase in financing
costs would decrease the share by 5.0 percentage points.
Columns 2 and 3 show the results for industries of high and low complexity, respectively,
and column 4 reports their difference. Again, we consider the experiment described above.
In an industry of low complexity, the share of open account is predicted to decrease by 7.1
percentage points in response to the higher interest rates. The change in enforcement does
not imply a significant change in open account. In a highly complex industry, a change in
enforcement should decrease the open account share by 1.5 percentage points. The coefficient
is, however, insignificant. The difference in the changes in open account between the two
industries following the increase in enforcement is predicted to be −3.3 percentage points.
That is highly complex industries increase their cash in advance share relative to less complex
industries.
3.4 Robustness
In the following, we show that the qualitative results are robust to running regressions at
the industry level and to estimating a fractional response model.29
Industry Level Variation A potential concern is the endogeneity of the export intensity
at the firm level. To address this issue, we aggregate the data to industry-country level
and re-estimate our main specifications. The results from the industry level regressions
are reported in table 5. Columns 1 to 3 show our findings for the baseline specification.
The coefficients on the interactions between enforcement and the export intensity are highly
significant and negative, confirming the firm-level estimation results. Coefficients on the
interaction between the variables measuring financing costs and the export intensity of firms
have the predicted signs. They are, however, insignificant.
Regressions including the triple interactions with complexity are reported in columns 4
to 6. The triple interaction coefficients for enforcement have the predicted negative signs
and are highly significant. For the financing-cost proxies, the coefficients on the net interest
margin and the overhead costs have the predicted positive signs and are highly significant. It
turns out that at the industry level, these two coefficients are estimated more precisely than
at the firm level, suggesting that firm variation adds more noise than information along this
28The percentiles correspond to the following countries and values: Enforcement: El Salvador (p25)
0.0012723 (786 days); Turkey (p75) 0.002381 (420 days); Interest Margin: Lithuania (p25): 0.032 ; South
Africa (p75): 0.072.
29We found that our results also hold when using a Tobit model for lognormal data. Results are available
upon request.
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dimension. The coefficient on the private credit has the predicted sign but is insignificant.
Overall, the results at the industry level are fully consistent with our firm-level regressions.
In particular, we find strong support for the predictions on industry complexity and payment
contract choice.
Fractional Response Model The share of open account is by definition constrained to
lie between 0 and 1. Additionally, as should be expected, there are mass points for open
account both at values 0 and 1. To directly account for these aspects of the dependent
variable we use a fractional response model.30 The results are presented in table 6. Because
the fractional response model is non-linear we report the average marginal effect for each
variable in the table. In the main specification all coefficients of interest have the expected
sign and are highly significant, with the exception of the private credit interaction term in
column 2. This confirms that our results in the baseline regressions are robust towards the
mass point at an open account share of one. In two of the three specifications where it
is included, the triple interaction coefficient for enforcement is highly significant and has
the predicted sign. The coefficient on the triple interaction with enforcement in column 5 is
statistically not significant, as in the baseline specification.31 The triple interaction terms for
our proxies of financing costs are only significant in the case of private credit in column 5.32
Overall, the results presented on enforcement and financing costs as well as complexity, using
OLS regression are robust towards the mass point and fractional nature of the dependent
variable.
To summarize, the payment contract choice model is strongly supported by the data.
Running regressions for the industry average delivers almost identical results to the firm-
level regressions. Employing a fractional response model instead of OLS does not change
our findings. Replacing the baseline proxy for financing costs, the net interest rate margin,
by other measures hardly changes the estimated relationships.
4 Conclusions
Complementing research on aggregate data by Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and on a single
US firm by Antra`s and Foley (2011), this paper uses firm-level survey data to test for the
determinants of the payment contract choice of firms. The empirical findings support the
predictions of Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) as well as our new theoretical results on the role of
product complexity. Legal and financial conditions in the source country affect the contract
choice as expected and the data is in line with the idea that enforcement and product
complexity are complements. Different to Antra`s and Foley (2011), the paper is able to
study the effects of source country variation and analyze differences across industries. We
find both aspects to be highly relevant for the contract choice of firms.
For future research better data is essential. Ideally, new payment contract data would
contain information at the country-pair level to fully test the choice model developed in
30For details on the methodology see Papke and Wooldridge (1996). See Ramalho et al. (2011) for a survey.
31The sign of the coefficient is positive, while in the baseline it is negative.
32Similar to the baseline specification with complexity, the interaction between the net interest margin
and complexity is insignificant, although marginally when using the fractional response model.
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Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and extended here. A further analysis of the role of firm and
industry characteristics following this paper as well as more work on dynamic aspects of
payment contract choice along the lines of Antra`s and Foley (2011) should lead to interesting
new results and help shed more light on exporter-importer relationships.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4 Note that
∂2(E[ΠOAE ]−E[ΠCIAE ])
∂λ∂γ
= − (1−η)λγ−1
1+r∗ [1 + γ lnλ]. This is
smaller than zero if 1 + γ lnλ > 0. This is less likely the case for higher γ. Inserting the
maximum value of γ = 1 delivers the sufficient condition λ > 1/e. The rest of the proof
follows the previous proof for Proposition 3. Taking the triple derivatives with respect to
XS, γ and λ and 1 + r, respectively, the claims are easy to verify.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Observations
OA .6261124 .3686646 3762
Export intensity .4408045 .3672502 3762
Log Sales per Worker 13.17973 2.857682 3762
Log Employment 4.315473 1.335444 3762
Ln Age 2.746627 .7937053 3762
Manager’s Experience 20.27698 11.62479 3762
State Owned .0079452 .0744263 3762
Importer .7666135 .4230423 3762
Enforcement .0019462 .0009509 3762
Private Credit .4298971 .2757892 3762
Interest Margin .0535854 .0261838 3762
Overhead Costs .0449765 .0256605 3741
Industry Complexity .5493759 .1959645 3762
B Tables
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Table 2: Number of Observation by Country
Country No of Observations Country No of Observations
Albania 12 Madagascar 21
Angola 2 Malawi 5
Argentina 166 Mali 45
Armenia 36 Mauritius 30
Bangladesh 235 Mexico 73
Benin 13 Moldova 99
Bolivia 65 Mozambique 9
Botswana 7 Nepal 31
Brazil 99 Niger 2
Bulgaria 243 Nigeria 22
BurkinaFaso 11 Panama 26
Cameroon 32 Paraguay 49
Chile 116 Peru 144
Colombia 178 Philippines 116
Ecuador 55 Poland 102
ElSalvador 141 Romania 22
Fyr Macedonia 70 Russia 101
Gambia 4 Senegal 40
Georgia 15 SouthAfrica 113
Guatemala 119 Swaziland 6
Honduras 52 Tanzania 24
Indonesia 16 Turkey 304
Kazakhstan 6 Uganda 22
Kenya 108 Uruguay 91
Kyrgyz Republic 7 Vietnam 258
Latvia 65 Zambia 26
Lithuania 108
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Table 4: Average Effects
This table computes an example to evaluate the economic relevance of our estimates. Robust standard errors
are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
The dependent variable is the sum of post-sale and on-sale payment (OA). The table shows by how many
percentage points Open Account would change in financing costs and enforcement in the source country,
respectively, increased from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile.
Baseline Low Complexity High Complexity Difference
(25th pctl) (75th pctl) (75th-25th pctl)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enforcement -0.063*** 0.018 -0.015 -0.033*
(0.015) (0.029) (0.026) (0.018)
Interest Margin -0.050** -0.071** -0.029 0.042
(0.022) (0.035) (0.028) (0.026)
N 3,762 3,762 3,762 3,762
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Table 5: Payment Contract Choice: Industry-Country Averages
Notes: This table reports robustness checks where the data is aggregated to the industry-country level.
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively. The standard errors are robust. The dependent variable is the sum of payments at
post- and on-sale delivery (OA). The industry complexity is measured as the share of the intermediates used,
which are not traded on an exchange or no reference price exists. All regressions include country, industry
and year fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export intensity 0.102** 0.091*** 0.124*** 0.148* 0.057 0.147*
(0.050) (0.035) (0.046) (0.078) (0.055) (0.076)
Enforcement x Export intensity -64.313*** -73.013*** -66.644*** 26.447 -29.154 21.354
(15.878) (17.894) (15.730) (27.030) (37.544) (27.173)
Enforcement x Export intensity x Complexity -161.048*** -72.186 -153.217***
(48.514) (72.048) (47.429)
Interest Margin x Export intensity -0.067 -3.302***
(0.539) (1.103)
Interest Margin x Export intensity x Complexity 6.074***
(1.817)
Private Credit x Export intensity 0.057 0.164
(0.053) (0.126)
Private Credit x Export intensity x Complexity -0.223
(0.246)
Overhead x Export intensity -0.511 -3.314***
(0.540) (1.143)
Overhead x Export intensity x Complexity 5.426***
(1.949)
Export intensity x Complexity -0.087 0.059 -0.065
(0.112) (0.080) (0.103)
Enforcement x Complexity 70.118*** 13.275 64.979***
(18.361) (31.114) (17.699)
Interest Margin x Complexity -2.356***
(0.554)
Private Credit x Complexity 0.050
(0.115)
Overhead x Complexity -2.382***
(0.612)
R-squared 0.305 0.306 0.307 0.316 0.315 0.319
N 1,141 1,141 1,132 1,141 1,141 1,132
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Table 6: Fractional Response Model
This table presents the results of the baseline specification and robustness checks for the financial proxy.
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels respectively. The standard errors are robust. The dependent variable is the sum of post-sale
and on-sale payment (OA). Enforcement is proxied by the inverse days to enforce a contract. The financial
proxies are the net interest rate margin, private credit and overhead costs. All regressions include country,
industry and year fixed effects and the firm-level controls discussed in the text.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export intensity 1.343** 0.228 1.072** 0.690 -1.410* -0.011
(0.534) (0.315) (0.459) (1.397) (0.856) (1.238)
Enforcement x Export intensity -496.127*** -492.707*** -441.188*** 102.779 -502.495 171.648
(132.820) (157.920) (126.691) (340.970) (391.399) (332.514)
Enforcement x Export intensity x Complexity -1056.779** 80.099 -1101.751**
(529.849) (601.663) (514.165)
Interest Margin x Export intensity -14.703*** -25.926*
(5.535) (13.728)
Interest Margin x Export intensity x Complexity 20.438
(22.296)
Private Credit x Export intensity 0.808 4.765***
(0.517) (1.275)
Private Credit x Export intensity x Complexity -7.530***
(2.014)
Overhead x Export intensity -14.511*** -16.688
(5.239) (12.786)
Overhead x Export intensity x Complexity 4.256
(21.335)
N 3,762 3,762 3,741 3,762 3,762 3,741
25
